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 
Abstract—With the fast development of wearable IoT devices, 
their applications are becoming more and more pervasive, 
ranging from social networking, payment, and navigation to 
health and activity monitoring. The security of the 
communication between these devices is essential to protect the 
transmitted sensitive information from tampering and 
eavesdropping. With the integration of accelerometers into 
wearable IoT devices, the gait-based biometric cryptography 
technology has emerged as a data securing tool for wearables. 
This paper proposes a light-weight noise-based group key 
generation method, which utilizes the noise signals imposed on the 
raw acceleration signals to generate an M-bit key with high 
randomness and bit generation rate. Moreover, a signed sliding 
window coding (SSWC)-based common feature extraction 
method was designed to extract the common feature for sharing 
the generated M-bit key among devices worn on different body 
parts. Finally, a fuzzy vault-based group key distribution system 
was implemented and evaluated using a public dataset. The 
performed comprehensive analysis of the proposed key generation 
and distribution method proved that the binary keys generated 
via the introduced noise-based procedure have high entropy and 
can pass both the NIST and Dieharder statistical tests with high 
efficiency. The experimental results obtained prove the robustness 
of the proposed SSWC-based common feature extraction method 
in terms of the similarity and discriminability of intra- and 
inter-class features, respectively. 
 
Index Terms— Communication security, gait, body area 
network, secret key generation, key distribution 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ECENT years witnessed a remarkable growth in the 
variety and number of wearable IoT devices. The 
application of wearable IoT devices becomes more and 
more pervasive, ranging from social networking, payment, 
navigation, to health and activity monitoring [1]. A typical 
application scenario of the wearable IoT devices is shown in 
Fig.1. Various kinds of personal data concerning health status, 
social data, daily activity, bank accounts, etc., are collected and 
wirelessly transmitted to the mobile gateway by wearable IoT 
devices [2, 3]. Due to the privacy and sensitivity features of 
personal data and the wireless nature of the communication, the 
security of communication between these devices is essential to 
protect the transmitted data from being eavesdropped, tampered, 
or injected with malicious commands, while data sharing has to 
be kept strictly among body-worn devices that belong to the 
same user [4, 5].  
 
Fig.1. Typical application  scenarios of wearable IoT devices 
 
However, due to the limited power and computing resources 
of wearable IoT devices, traditional channel encryption 
methods such as the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) peer-to-peer key 
exchange algorithm, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport 
Layer Security (TLS), etc., cannot be directly applied to 
wearable devices [6]. The personal identification number (PIN) 
is currently used as an authentication method for some mobile 
devices like cellphones, but it is not suitable for small-sized 
Accelerometer-Based Key Generation and 
Distribution Method for Wearable IoT Devices 
Fangmin Sun, Member, IEEE, Weilin Zang, Haohua Huang, Ildar Farkhatdinov and Ye Li*, Senior 
Member, IEEE 
R 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
2 
wearable IoT devices, which usually have no input interface 
[7]. 
Since the conventional security schemes proposed for 
computers are too computationally demanding for miniaturized 
wearable IoT devices [8], new methods of securing body sensor 
networks (BSNs) have been offered, in which a biometric 
cryptosystem (BCS) is considered a quite effective solution [9]. 
The biometrics-based approach avoids memory overload and 
obviates expensive computation, insofar as biometric traits are 
already available in the wearable device. With regards to BCS 
security solutions, such physiological characteristics as an 
individual’s face, iris and fingerprints have already been widely 
applied to the identity authentication of mobile devices, but 
these biometric features are vulnerable to theft and duplication. 
In contrast, the recently emerged bioencryption technology 
uses real-time physiological biometrics such as the 
electrocardiogram (ECG) [10-12] and photoplethysmogram 
(PPG) [13-15] to generate the random key to secure private 
information. However, these physiological biometrics require 
specialized sensors to be in physical contact with the human 
body, which can make the user uncomfortable. Moreover, the 
sampled signal quality can be easily interfered with by the 
external environment and human activity [16].  
Nowadays, with the availability of the integrated inertial 
measurement units (IMU) in wearable IoT devices, such 
behavioral traits as gait, keyboard tapping, etc. are gaining 
much attention for their noninvasive and unique features [17, 
18]. In many types of wearable IoT devices, it is more 
convenient to extract the gait signal than other physiological 
signals like ECG and PPG. 
Due to human gait uniqueness and non-variability over time, 
it has been utilized for user authentication or identification of 
wearable IoT devices in multiple previous studies [19-22]. 
These studies used gait information to protect the security of 
the wearable devices by providing a gait-based access control 
mechanism; however, the safety of the data transmitted 
between devices was not guaranteed. Wazid et al. proposed a 
key agreement and management scheme for implantable and 
wearable medical devices [23, 24] and used the formal security 
verification and informal security analysis to prove their 
scheme’s security against known attacks. 
Acceleration-based symmetric key generation method was 
first proposed by Bichler et al.  to encrypt the communication in 
wireless body area networks [25]. In their scheme, the devices 
have to be shaken together to ensure that they can generate the 
same symmetric key based on the acceleration signal caused by 
the shake. This direction was followed by Mayrhofer et al., who 
proposed a secure pairing scheme of mobile devices that 
exploited the joint movement caused by simultaneous shaking 
as a shared secret to realizing the secure pairing of devices [27]. 
Further, Sun et al. proposed the IPIs (Inter-Pulse Intervals) 
based random number generation method for securing the 
communication of wearable IoT devices [28, 29]. However, the 
key generation rate of this method was too low, as they used the 
gait cycles instead of sample points to extract the random 
binaries. Alternatively, Xu et al. designed a symmetric secret 
key generation scheme that allowed two legitimate devices to 
establish a common cryptographic key by exploiting users’ gait 
characteristics [30, 31]. In contrast to the above shake-based 
key generation methods, gait-based ones require no human 
intervention and are more user-friendly. Bruesch et al. provided 
a comprehensive discussion of the security properties of pairing 
schemes, including the efficiency of the quantization and 
authentication algorithms, statistical properties of the generated 
sequences, and the possible threats and security levels of the 
system, etc. [32]. 
Recently, Wu et al. proposed a novel machine learning 
framework that uses an auto-encoder to help one device predict 
the gait observations at another remote device attached to the 
same body and generate the key using the predicted sensor data 
[33]. However, this method is not flexible because once the 
sensor’s position changes, a new predicting model target for the 
new sensor position needs to be trained. 
From another view of point, Revadigar et al. presented a 
gait-based group key generation and distribution scheme for 
body area networks [26]. The on-board accelerometer sensor 
and the unique walking style of the user were used to generate 
random binaries by M-ary coding algorithms. Although sample 
points were used for key generation in this scheme, the guard 
band inserted between two consecutive quantization levels 
decreased the key generation rate. Moreover, the common 
information extraction algorithms used for sensors and 
coordinator placed on body parts other than chest is too energy 
and time-consuming. 
We proposed an acceleration-based key generation and 
distribution method for wearable IoT devices based on the 
above survey and comparative analysis of available techniques. 
The coordinator takes advantage of the noise randomness to 
generate a group key and uses the common feature of the gait 
signal sampled from different body parts to distribute the key to 
other sensor nodes on the same body. The motivation for this 
study can be summarized as follows: 
1. Due to the privacy and sensitivity features of personal 
data and the wireless nature of the communication, the security 
of the communication between these devices is essential to 
protect the transmitted data from being eavesdropped, tampered, 
or injected with malicious commands, while data sharing has to 
be kept strictly among body-worn devices that belong to the 
same user. 
2. The available robust security solutions are not suitable 
for wearable devices. Firstly, conventional security schemes 
proposed for computers are too computationally demanding for 
miniaturized wearable IoT devices. Secondly, there are some 
deficiencies in data acquisition, anti-jamming and anti-attack of 
the recently emerging physiological biometrics-based 
bio-encryption technology. 
3. With a decrease of in the cost and size of the 
acceleration sensors, more and more wearable IoT devices are 
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integrated with accelerometers for monitoring the human daily 
activities. The behavioral biometrics based bio-encryption 
methods are gaining much attention for their noninvasive and 
unique features. 
4. Despite numerous advantages of accelerometer-based 
bio-encryption methods over conventional ones, their 
significant improvement is still required, including such 
features as the key randomness and the key distribution success 
rate.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The relavant 
recent works are discussed in Section II. The overview of the 
proposed security system for wearable IoT devices is 
introduced in Section III. The noise-based key generation 
method and gait characteristic-based common information 
extraction method are described in Section IV. The design of 
the fuzzy vault-based key distribution protocol is presented in 
Section V. The system performance concerning the key 
randomness, bit generation rates, and common information 
similarity are evaluated in Section VI. Finally, the conclusions 
are drawn, and the direction of follow-up studies outlined in 
Section VII. 
II. BACKGROUND 
With the development of wearable IoT devices, their 
information security became the object of multiple studies. In 
this section, related works on biometric cryptographic systems 
and gait based key generation and distribution methods are 
summarized and analyzed.  
A. Random bit sequence generation methods  
To provide strong security of wearable IoT devices, a good 
random number generator (RNG) is essential. RNG is a critical 
component in any cryptographic system, producing random 
numbers to be used for both asymmetric and symmetric key 
generation, block cipher initialization vectors, one-time 
padding, digital signatures, and password storage [34]. 
There are two basic types of RNGs: true random number 
generators (TRNG) and pseudo-random number generators 
(PRNG). PRNGs are widely used in cryptographic systems as 
they can easily generate not truly random numbers at high 
speeds. However, PRNGs are vulnerable to brute-force attacks 
if the seed selection is faulty. To solve this problem, many 
state-of-the-art practical PRNGs use seeds generated by 
TRNGs to enhance the entropy and security level. However, the 
hardware-based TRNG methods, which require special 
integrated circuits to be embedded into the devices, are not 
suitable for wearable IoT decices due to their limited power and 
computational resources [35]. 
In recent years, several researchers used physiological 
signals to generate secure keys. For example, Pirbhulal et al. 
used IPIs of heartbeats to generate the random binary sequence 
for wireless BSNs, which incorporated a finite monotonic 
increasing sequence generation mechanism of IPIs and a cyclic 
block encoding procedure that extracted entropic bits from each 
IPI [13]. However, the heartbeat rate of a healthy person varies 
between 60-100 beats/min, as the above method uses the 
unpredictable change of IPIs to generate a random binary 
sequence, so the random bits generation rate is usually lower 
than the heartbeats rate. Miao et al. used the PPG and ECG 
signals to generate the key and secure the BSN [15]. However, 
the sampled signal quality was found to be deteriorated by the 
external environment. Human gait, due to its uniqueness and 
non-variability over time, has started to be utilized for securing 
wearable IoT devices in numerous studies [16-29], and is 
becoming an emerging research field. 
B. Security key distribution method 
The key distribution techniques are established based on two 
cryptographic primitives, namely the fuzzy commitment [35] 
and fuzzy vault [36] schemes. These two primitives have been 
widely investigated for the purpose of biometric key 
distribution, and their applicability to wearable device security 
has been analyzed by numerous studies [26, 35, 38]. These 
techniques used physiological or behavioral signals as common 
information to distribute and extract the key securely. The 
similarity of the common information is a key factor that 
influences the key distribution success rate. 
Since each person has his/her own walking style, including 
the stride length and the stepping frequency, the gait signal 
collected at different body parts has a remarkable similarity, 
insofar as sensors placed in different body locations capture the 
same signal. Thus, gait features have been exploited to 
construct the vault and unlock it.  
However, due to the complexity of body movements, devices 
placed in different body locations will capture different 
acceleration signals due to the movement of other body parts 
(such as arms), and this becomes the key challenge when 
exploiting the common gait signal for key fuzzy vault-based 
key distribution.  
Fig. 2 depicts the acceleration signal in the gravity direction 
captured by devices placed at different body locations when the 
user was walking. It was infeasible to use the raw motion 
signals captured by the sensors to generate a common secret 
key directly. To address this challenge, we used the principal 
component analysis technique to separate the signals produced 
from gait and arm swing and apply the SSWC-based peak 
coding method to extract the common gait feature for fuzzy 
vault-based key distribution.  
 
Fig.2. Acceleration signal from different body parts in the gravity direction 
captured by devices worn at different body locations when the user was 
walking 
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C. Challenges and contributions  
Despite a significant progress made in previous studies, 
developments, the following problematic issues in the 
gait-based key generation and distribution methods need to be 
solved for their further large-scale application: 
1. Generating a robust random key sequence: using the gait 
signal to generate a random key sequence directly would reduce 
the randomness due to the periodicity of human gait. Under the 
limited computing and energy resources, improving the 
randomness of the gait-based secret key is quite a challenge. 
2. Extracting common information for key distribution: to 
distribute the generated key among all legitimate devices 
secretly, the common information shared by all devices should 
be extracted to lock and unlock the vault. Unlike the ECG or 
PPG signals sampled from different body parts which have a 
strong similarity, the acceleration signals sampled from 
different body parts are quite different due to the movement of 
other body parts (such as arms). Hence, extracting common 
information from acceleration signals sampled from different 
body locations is a more challenging problem, as compared to 
the ECG based methods. 
To resolve the above problems, a light-weight noise-based 
random number generation method and a signed sliding 
window coding (SSWC) based common information extraction 
method were proposed in this work. In addition, the M-bit key 
distribution system was designed based on the fuzzy vault 
algorithm, and its performance was validated with a public 
dataset. The main contributions of this work can be 
summarized as follows. 
1. A light-weight noise-based key generation method with high 
randomness and bit generation rate was proposed. The key 
generation rate (100bps in this study) for the proposed method 
is as high as the signal sampling rate when using no multilevel 
coding schemes.  
2. The energy and time consumption of the proposed methods 
was significantly reduced. The energy and time consumed by 
the coordinator for key generation, common information 
extraction, and vault construction are 4.95mJ and 3.84ms, 
which reduced the energy and time consumption by 61% and 
98.2%, respectively, as compared to [26]. 
3. An SSWC-based common information extraction method 
was proposed to lock and unlock the vault in the key 
distribution process. Time scale and frequency scale 
information was fused to extract the common features. The 
average intra-body similarity of common features extracted 
from sensors on different body locations was 0.92, while the 
average inter-body similarity was just 0.39 (λ=0.5), which 
proved its excellent ability of detecting whether the sensors 
were worn on the same body or not. 
4. A fuzzy vault-based key distribution method was proposed to 
share the generated key among sensors on the same body. 
Based on the proposed common information extraction, and the 
fuzzy vault construction framework, the average key 
distribution success rate reached 0.95. 
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
In this section, the system overview of the proposed key 
generation method is presented. The system consists of a hub 
node and several sensor nodes. The hub node is usually a 
smartphone, which acts as a controller and a signal processor. 
The sensor nodes transmit the sampled various kinds of 
information to the hub node and execute the instructions issued 
by the hub node. In the network, the hub node generates the 
secret key using the accelerometer and pre-shares with 
legitimate sensor nodes through a fuzzy vault. The legitimate 
sensor nodes extract the key using the common gait feature 
received from the vault. The proposed wearable sensor network 
is shown in Fig.3 (a). 
 
Fig. 3. The overview of the system and the proposed methods 
The overview of the proposed key generation and 
distribution system is depicted in Fig.3 (b). The network 
coordinator first sends a broadcast packet through the public 
channel to start the processes of key generation and distribution. 
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The broadcast1 contains the information on time duration T for 
the next data collection. The coordinator and sensors, which 
need to join the network, start to collect the acceleration data 
upon receiving the broadcast packet for the next T duration. 
Then, the coordinator uses the collected data to generate the 
random group key and extract the common information. After 
hiding the group key in a vault constructed using the common 
information, the coordinator integrates the vault with another 
broadcast packet and sends it to sensors. When sensors receive 
the second broadcast packet, they unlock the vault using the 
common information they extracted from the collected 
acceleration data and get the group key hidden in the vault. The 
definitions of parameters used in the proposed system are listed 
in Table I.  
TABLE I. DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEM PARAMETERS  
Parameter Description  
M The length of key bits 
wt The window size of the time scale 
λ 
The coefficient used to calculate the window 
size 
N The polynomial order 
L 
The length of the acceleration signal used to 
extract common information 
v The vault size 
In the following sections, the key generation methods, the 
common information extraction method, and the fuzzy 
vault-based key distribution method are described in detail. 
IV. KEY GENERATION METHOD 
In this section, we introduce the noise-based M-bit key 
generation method, including the noise extraction method 
based on the zero-phase Butterworth filter, the coding method, 
and the M-bit key generation method. The main idea of the 
proposed method was inspired by the fact that the noise 
superimposed on the regular gait signal, which mainly caused 
by the irregular motion of human body parts and the nearby 
environment (such as electromagnetic interference and power 
frequency interference), possesses the characteristic of 
randomness and uncertainty, and is a good source of entropy.  
Noteworthy is that the accelerometer's noise is random, 
which makes it a good entropy source to generate the random 
binary sequence. A noise-based random key generation method 
was designed, and the common gait information was extracted 
to share the key among the devices worn on the same body. The 
proposed scheme can improve the user experience significantly, 
as walking is a normal activity, and the wearable IoT devices 
can access the network automatically when the user is walking. 
A. Overview of the noise-based key generation algorithm  
The proposed key generation method is presented in 
Algorithm 1. It includes five main steps: filtering, 
normalization, noise extraction, coding according to the noise 
level, and downsampling to enhance the randomness. First, the 
three-axis acceleration signal (ACCx, ACCy, and ACCz) is 
filtered through a specially designed zero-phase filter, and the 
amplitudes of raw and filtered signals are normalized. Then, the 
noise is extracted via the difference between the raw and 
filtered signals. The random bit sequences are generated 
according to the noise level and the XOR operator is applied to 
the RBS to enhance the randomness of the sequences. Finally, 
the M-bit random key is generated by down-sampling the 
generated sequence. 
 
B. Zero-phase filtering process 
An accurate noise signal extraction is the key to the 
noise-based key generation method. However, the phase shift 
caused by the conventional filter makes it very difficult to 
extract the noise signal.  
Keeping the phase and amplitude of the signal undistorted is 
a key factor to precisely extract the noise superimposed on the 
gait signal. For this purpose, we designed a zero-phase 
four-order low-pass Butterworth filter to remove the 
high-frequency noise. As the average gait frequency is between 
1.7 and 2.7 Hz, the cut-off frequency of the designed filter is set 
to 3 Hz. The flowchart of the zero-phase filtering process is 
shown in Fig. 4. 
The three-axis raw acceleration signals (represented by r_sig) 
are first inputted into the designed low-pass Butterworth filter. 
Then, the first output filtered signal f_sig is reversed and 
converted to the time-reversed signal rev_f_sig. The latter is 
inputted into the above filter and reversed again to yield 
rev_ff_sig with a zero-phase distortion. 
Figure 5(a) presents an example of zero-phase filtering 
results: as compared to the raw signal, the phase of the filtered 
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one remains unchanged, but the amplitude is largely attenuated 
by the square of the filter's response magnitude. 
 
 
Fig.4. Flowchart of the zero-phase filtering process 
 
Fig.5. An example of zero-phase filtered signal and its normalization 
C. Noise extraction and coding 
To compensate for the attenuation of signal amplitude, the 
magnitudes of signals r_sig and the ff_sig are normalized 
before calculating their difference. As seen in Fig. 5 (b), the 
difference between the amplitudes of r_sig and ff_sig was 
reduced by the above normalization procedure. 
Next, the noise n-sig is calculated via the difference between 
the raw and filtered signals as follows:  
_ _ _n sig r sig ff sig                            (1) 
For the coding process, three binary sequences would be 
generated, according to the noise value imposed on the 
three-axis acceleration. If n_sig is negative, the binary is set at 
“1”; otherwise, it is set at “0”. After the same process is 
performed for the three-axis acceleration signal, values of 
key_x, key_y, and key_z are calculated, as shown in Fig.6. 
 
Fig.6. Coding by the n-sig value  
To enhance the generated key randomness, the XOR 
operation is performed for key_x, key_y, and key_z.  
_ _ _key key x key y key z  
                (2) 
According to the length of the acceleration signal used to 
generate the secret key, one can further enhance the 
randomness by downsampling the binary sequence. Finally, the 
wearable IoT device generates the M-bit secret key key_M, 
which will be used to secure the data transmitted through the 
wireless channel.  
V. SSWC-BASED GAIT COMMON INFORMATION EXTRACTION 
METHOD 
The common gait feature information shared by all sensor 
nodes worn on the same body is used to lock and unlock the 
vault. The intra-similarity of the extracted common information 
is a very important factor for key distribution.  
During walking, the raw acceleration measured by multiple 
body-worn devices is the result of the user's gait as well as the 
movement of individual body parts, e.g., feet and arms, and 
hence, devices located in different places experience different 
accelerations, as shown in Fig.2. However, from the time scale, 
positions of the peak points caused by heel-strike events and 
though/valley points caused by toe-off events are identical. So, 
in this section, the time scale information of the gait features is 
extracted as common information, and a signed slide window 
coding (SSWC)-based method is designed and used to extract 
the common information shared by all nodes on the same body. 
Before the SSWC-based common information extraction, the 
raw signal is firstly preprocessed by the principal component 
analysis (PCA) method to reduce the dimensionality of the 
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acceleration signal. 
A. Data preprocessing 
For the data preprocessing, the high-frequency noise was 
first reduced by a low-pass Butterworth filter with a 3 Hz 
cut-off frequency. In order to reduce the impact of the irregular 
motion of other body parts on common gait information 
extraction, the sampled acceleration signal was first 
preprocessed by a low-pass filter and the principal component 
analysis (PCA) algorithm. The PCA could effectively extract 
the signal caused by gait from the raw signals, whereas the first 
component of the signal represented the motion caused by gait. 
According to our test results, the contribution rate of the first 
component was exceeded 90%.  
The r_signal is composed of the three-axis acceleration 
signals. The format of the r_signal is given by Eq.(3). The PCA 
analysis results are formulated in Eq.(4), where E and E(:,1) 
correspond to eigenvectors of r_signal and maximum 
eigenvalues, respectively. 
1 2
1 2
1 2
_ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _
M
M
M
acc x acc x acc x
r signal acc y acc y acc y
acc z acc z acc z
 
 
 
  
(3) 
'_ (:,1) * _pca signal E r signal                    (4) 
The signal after the PCA process is depicted in Fig.7. The 
peak points of the pca_signal are caused by toe-off events 
while the valley points are caused by heel-strike events. The 
occurrence time of the two gait events detected by different 
sensors is of high consistency. Therefore, in this study, the 
occurrence time of the toe-off and heel-strike events was used 
to generate the common information, as well as to construct and 
deconstruct the fuzzy vault. 
 
 
Fig.7. The PCA results of the acceleration signal sampled from different body 
parts  
B. SSWC-based common information extraction 
In this section, the proposed signed slide window coding 
(SSWC) method is described. Firstly, the pca_signal is inputted 
into the fast Fourier transformation (FFT) model to calculate 
the step frequency fstep, and then the window size for 
SSWC-based common feature extraction is set according to fstep. 
It can be seen in Fig.8 that frequency peaks of signals sampled 
from three different body parts are very similar.  
 
Fig. 8. The FFT results of the pca_signal sampled from different body parts 
The sliding window size wt for SSWC-based common 
information extraction is defined as follows:  
* st
step
f
w
f

 
  
  
                                    (5) 
where fs is the sampling frequency, fstep is the detected step 
frequency, λ is a parameter set according to the application 
scenarios. The range of λ is (0,1], whereas smaller values of λ
correspond to higher the security level and computing 
complexity.  
 
In the proposed SSWC quantization method, the existing peak 
and valley points in the Nth window, if any, are coded as N and –
N, respectively. In the absence of such peak or valley points in 
the window, the latter just slides forward. One of the 
quantization examples is depicted in Fig. 9. We set the window 
size factor λ= 0.15. 
 
Fig.9. Non-overlapping signed sliding window coding of the peak value.  
VI. KEY DISTRIBUTION METHOD 
Fuzzy vault is a theoretically secure cryptographic construct 
for hiding a secret key in vault V by using a set A. The vault can 
be unlocked only by another set B that sufficiently overlaps 
with A. 
The proposed fuzzy vault-based key distribution method 
mainly includes two procedures: the vault locking process and 
the vault unlocking one. The workflow of the key distribution 
algorithm is presented in Fig.10. 
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Fig.10 Fuzzy vault-based secrete key distribution process 
A. Vault construction 
The fuzzy vault construction process mainly includes the 
following steps, as shown in Fig.10: 
1. Data segmentation: in order to conceal the random binary 
key sequence in the vault, the binary sequence is segmented 
into N, and  
0 1 2bit / / / / / / / / Ns C C C C                    (6) 
2. Polynomial construction: the segmented values are used as 
coefficients to construct an N-order polynomial f(x). 
2
0 1 2( ) ...
N
Nf x C C x C x C x               (7) 
3. Vault construction: using the common information A 
extracted in the previous subsection, the mapping of common 
information on polynomials is computed to obtain P. Then, a 
large number of chaff points are added, and the fuzzy vault is 
constructed. Finally, the coordinator sends the constructed 
fuzzy vault V to the sensor nodes. 
The projection of set A on polynomial p is calculated to 
obtain the set P = (A, f(A)). A large set of random chaff points C 
that excludes set A of elements and does not intersect with 
polynomial p is constructed to obtain the vault via Eq.(10). 
Vault V will be a large set of points, in which secret points of P 
are masked by random chaff points (noise). The chaff points are 
added to V in such way that they cannot be distinguished from P 
using the statistical analysis:  
 0 1 2, , , , kA x x x x                              (8) 
 0 0 1 1 2 2( , ( )), ( , ( )), ( , ( )),..., ( , ( ))K KP x f x x f x x f x x f x   (9) 
V P C                                                 (10) 
B. Unlocking the vault 
For the vault unlocking process, when sensor nodes receive 
the vault sent by the coordinator, they use the common 
information B extracted from the acceleration signal to 
reconstruct the polynomials and then get the key concealed in 
the polynomials.  
 ' ' ' '0 1 2, , , , lB x x x x                         (11) 
VII. EVALUATION 
In this section, we design experiments to test the 
performance of the proposed key generation and distribution 
methods. For the key generation methods, the randomness and 
bit generation rate are mainly considered. For the key 
distribution rates, we mainly analyze the correlation coefficient 
among the common data extracted from different body parts. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) is used to evaluate 
the intra- and inter-similarity of common information.  
A. Performance of the key generation method 
For key extraction between a pair of wireless devices, the bit 
mismatch rate is defined as the number of bits that do not match 
between two devices divided by the total number of secret bits 
extracted. For group key extraction, it is defined as the 
averaged bit mismatch rate from all pairs of devices in the 
group. 
1. Randomness test 
For the randomness of the generated binary sequence, the 
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) and the 
Dieharder tests were conducted to assess the randomness 
performance. The latest NIST-STS version 2.1.2 included 15 
tests, each of which was designed to test a pre-defined null 
hypothesis. The tested sequence was random and designated by 
H0. It also produced a probability value (p-value) in the range of 
the interval [0, 1]. If the p-value was larger than the threshold, 
H0 was accepted; otherwise, H0 was rejected [38]. However, 
limited by the length of the generated binary sequence, we 
selected several tests from NIST to perform the randomness 
evaluation. The test results are listed in Table II.  
Dieharder statistical tests consisted of tests from Diehard and 
many improved tests from NIST [39]. The distribution of 
p-values of 100 runs of the Dieharder tests for the dataset 
sampled from the right wrist is shown in Fig. 11. If a p-value 
from the Dieharder statistical test is below 0.001, the test is 
considered as failed. However, p-values are expected not to 
exceed 0.05 (weak) 5% of the time. The results showed no 
failure incidents in any tests and included a few incidents where 
p ≤ 0.05 was expected. Furthermore, the p-values of all tests 
were well-distributed over the interval [0, 1], indicating that 
keys successfully passed all the Dieharder statistical tests. 
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                                   TABLE II: P-VALUE RESULTS OF THE  NIST  STATISTICAL TESTS  
NIST Test 
p-value 
Right wrist Right side of the pelvis 
Frequency 0.890121 0.869021 
Block frequency 0.730901 0.887932 
FFT 0.233295 0.678987 
Runs 0.212568 0.689091 
Longest run 0.476970 0.744939 
Entropy 0.989152 0.996787 
Serial 0.517388 0.897461 
Non-overlapping template 0.367982 0.476098 
Cumulative sums forward 0.873556 0.901933 
Cumulative sums reverse 0.657120 0.790993 
 
Fig.11. The distribution of p-values in the Dieharder tests 
 
2. Bit generation rate 
The bit generation rate represents the number of secret bits 
extracted per measurement. It denotes the average number of 
bits generated from acceleration samples per unit time and is 
usually measured in bits per second (bps). This metric evaluates 
how fast the coordinator can generate secret bits. 
As we used no complex multilevel coding methods, the bit 
generation rate of the proposed noise-based key generation 
method was only affected by the sampling rate of the 
acceleration signal. The maximum bit generation rate was the 
same as the sampling rate (100bps in this study). It took less 
than 2 seconds to generate a 128-bit key. 
Further, we compared the bit generation rate with three 
related works. The comparative analysis results listed in Table 
III strongly indicate that the proposed method, which uses no 
multilevel coding schemes, such as the m-ary, exhibits the bit 
generation rate outperforming those of three related key 
generation methods used for comparison. In particular, the first 
method was  the IPIs-based key generation method proposed by 
Sun et al. [29] using the variation between the lengths of each 
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gait cycle to generate the binary sequence. As the gait 
frequency is far lower than the sampling frequency, its bit 
generation rate is still very low, although multi bits were 
assigned to each cycle in the quantization process. The second 
one was the symmetric  key generation method proposed by Xu 
et al. [31], which implied coding the acceleration sample point 
itself to generate the random binary sequence. In the third 
method proposed by Revadigar et al. [26], the bit match rate 
and the bit sequence randomness were improved by using a 
multilevel quantization scheme, where a small band called 
‘guard band’ was inserted between two consecutive 
quantization levels. The samples in the guard band were 
excluded during quantization, which would reduce the bit 
generation rate. 
TABLE III: BIT GENERATION RATES OF THE PROPOSED METHOD AND THREE OTHER ONES [26, 29, 31]  
 
Sampling 
rate (Hz) 
Method Parameters 
Bit generation 
rate (bps) 
Time to generate a 
128-bit key (s) 
This study 100 
Noise-based key 
generation 
/ 100 1.28 
Sun et al. [29] 100 
IPIs-based key 
generation 
/ / ≈ 16 (32 gait cycles)  
Xu et al. [31] 100 
m-ary 
quantization 
m=2 28 4.6 
m=4 37 3.5 
m=8 43 3 
Revadigar et al. 
[26] 
50  
m-ary 
quantization 
m=2 
𝛼1∗ = 0.5 
W2*=50 
25 5.12 
m=8 
𝛼1∗ = 0.5 
W2*=50 
75 1.71 
m=32 
𝛼1∗ = 0.5 
W2*=50 
125 1.02 
1*: 𝛼 is the guard band- to-data ratio 
2*: W is the size of the non-overlapping moving window 
 
B. Performance of the key distribution method 
In this section, the factors that influence the key distribution 
are discussed, and the key distribution success rate is evaluated 
for different scenarios. Firstly, the similarity of the common 
information extracted from different body parts is compared 
and analyzed. 
1. The similarity of the common information 
The Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) was used to 
evaluate the similarity of the common information extracted 
from different body parts. PCC shows the linear relationship 
between two sets of data. Its value is ranged between -1 and +1, 
where −1 implies the total negative linear correlation, 0 
corresponds to no linear correlation, and +1 is the total positive 
linear correlation. The following equation is used to derive 
PCC. 
,
(( )( ))cov( , ) x y
x y
x y x y
E x yx y  

   
 
                   (12) 
where Cov is the covariance between x and y, σx and σy are the 
standard deviations of x and y, respectively, 𝜇𝑥 and 𝜇𝑦 are the 
mean values of x and y, respectively, while E is the expectation. 
The correlation between datasets is a measure of their 
relation closeness. The PCC between the common information 
extracted from different body parts reflects their similarity. The 
intra-similarity (of different body parts of the same subject) and 
the inter-similarity (of different body parts of different subjects) 
were analyzed.  
Firstly, in order to test the similarity of the common 
information extracted from sensors worn on different body 
parts, we used the PCC to evaluate the intra- and inter- 
similarities of the extracted common information when the 
window size factor λ varied from 0.1 to 1. 
The test results on the PCC between different body parts 
(Fig.12) implied that the correlation coefficient grew with  the 
window size. This finding was quite expected: when the 
window widened, peaks or valleys of different sensor signals 
were more likely to be in the same window.  
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Fig.12. Comparison of the similarity of time scale common information extracted from different body parts of the same subject and different subjects versus the 
window size: wt 
2. The key distribution success rate 
Besides, the key distribution success rate was tested to 
evaluate the overall key distribution performance. In this 
experiment, 500 samples of acceleration signals were collected 
by the hub node and sensor nodes synchronously. Then, a 
128-bit binary key sequence (b1, b2, …, b128) was first generated 
in the hub node, and a 16 order polynomial function was 
constructed using segments of the generated 128-bit binary key 
sequence as its coefficients, Ci=b(8*i+1), b(8*i+2), …, b(8*i+8), 
where i=0, 1, …, 16. The hub and the sensor node extracted 
their own common information through the previously 
collected 500 samples of acceleration signals using the 
proposed SSWC method with λ=0.15. Then the hub node sent 
the common information concealed in the vault with size of 300 
to the sensor nodes through a public channel. The sensor nodes 
attempted to reconstruct the eight-order polynomial using their 
own common information on receiving the vault.  
First, we tested the key distribution success probability using 
the open dataset ZJU-GaitAcc shared by [17]. The 
ZJU-GaitAcc dataset contains the gait acceleration series of 
175 subjects. 153 of which are present in two sessions (Session 
1 & 2). For each subject, six records are included in one session, 
where each record contains five gait acceleration series 
simultaneously measured at the right wrist (rw), left upper arm 
(lua), right side of the pelvis (rp), left thigh (lt), and right ankle 
(ra), respectively. In this experiment, we used the acceleration 
data of the 153 subjects in session 1 to test the key distribution 
success probability. For each subject, the sensor placed on the 
right side of the pelvis acted as a hub node and generated a 
128-bit binary key sequence using the data collected in the first 
record. Then, the hub node distributed the key sequence to 
other sensor nodes through the proposed fuzzy vault-based key 
distribution method. The intersection between the common 
information datasets extracted by the hub node and the sensor 
nodes was computed. If the size of the intersection dataset 
exceeded the polynomial order, the key distribution was a 
success, otherwise, it was failed. As there were six records for 
each subject, if the key was not successfully shared between the 
hub and sensor nodes, the next record was used to generate 
another common information datasets and make another 
attempt to distribute the binary key sequence through the fuzzy 
vault. The probabilities of success against the number of 
attempts for the sensors placed in different body locations (the 
hub node being placed on the pelvis right side) were calculated 
and plotted in Fig. 13. The results obtained show that the 
average success rate after a single attempt is about 0.95, and 
after four attempts, the success rate reaches 1. 
 
Fig. 13. Key distribution success probability tested on ZJU-GaitAcc dataset 
Further, we used the real word dataset RealWorld (HAR) 
shared by [42, 43] to test the robustness of the proposed 
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methods. This dataset was collected in real-world scenarios and 
covers six kinds of sensor data of 8 common activities: 
climbing stairs down and up, jumping, lying, standing, sitting, 
running/jogging, and walking. There were fifteen subjects 
(eight males and seven females) enrolled in the data collecting 
process. The participants’ statistical characteristics were: age 
31.9±12.4, height 173.1±6.9, and weight 74.1±13.8. For each 
activity, the acceleration of seven body positions (chest, 
forearm, head, shin, thigh, upper arm, and waist) was recorded 
simultaneously. According to our test purpose, only walking 
acceleration data of each subject was used for this experiment. 
The sampling frequency of the acceleration signal for walking 
is 50Hz, and the length of the acceleration signal for each 
subject is about ten minutes. Firstly, we removed the data 
collected in the first two minutes after the start to reduce the 
interference in the start-up phase of the experiment. Then, the 
next 3000 samples (about 1 minute long) were extracted and 
divided into six sections with equal length. 
The acceleration data collected on the waist were used to 
generate the key and construct the vault. In contrast, the 
acceleration data collected on the other body positions in the 
same section was used to unlock the vault and recover the key 
hidden in it. If the key was not successfully distributed through 
the acceleration data in the first section, the next section of 
acceleration data was used to generate another common 
information dataset and make another try to distribute the 
binary key sequence through the fuzzy vault. The key 
distribution success probabilities against the number of 
attempts for the sensors placed in different body locations (the 
waist sensor was used as the hub) were calculated and plotted in 
Fig. 14. We can see from the results that the distribution success 
probability after a single attempt was 0.94, being slightly lower 
than that obtained on the ZJU-GaitAcc dataset. The reason for 
the performance degradation is that the complex walking 
environments (non-flat ground condition, etc.) and the motion 
of other body parts (head, hand, etc.) deteriorated the gait 
signal's consistency sampled from different body positions.
 
Fig 14. Key distribution success probability tested on RealWorld (HAR) 
dataset 
C. Resource consumption analysis 
In this section, we evaluated the light-weight feature of the 
proposed method from the perspective of resource (including 
energy and time) consumption. The proposed noise-based key 
generation algorithm, SSWC-based gait common information 
extraction algorithm, and the fuzzy vault locking and unlocking 
algorithm were first converted to Android application programs. 
Next, the Trepn Profiler diagnostic tool [40] designed by 
Qualcomm was used to test the energy and time consumption of 
the proposed algorithms when generating and distributing a 
128-bit binary key. The energy and time consumptions of the 
proposed algorithms are summarized in Table IV. We further 
compared the resource consumption of the coordinator and the 
sensor with the model proposed in [26]. The comparison results 
are listed in Table V. One can see that, although the energy and 
time consumptions of the sensor in our work exceeded those of 
the chest-worn sensor in [26], the total energy and time 
consumption of the coordinator and the sensor were much 
lower than those in [26]. Besides, as the wrist-worn sensor 
needs to extract the gait signal from the sampled complex 
signal using the independent component analysis algorithm, the 
energy and time consumption of the wrist-worn sensor in [26] 
significantly exceeded ours.  
TABLE IV: ENERGY AND TIME CONSUMPTION TEST RESULTS 
Algorithm Energy (mJ) Time (ms) 
Key generation algorithm 0.1207 0.1331 
Gait common information 
extraction algorithm 
4.7911 3.6763 
Vault locking algorithm 0.0398 0.0277 
Vault unlocking algorithm 0.0467 0.0302 
 
TABLE V: COMPARISON RESULTS OF ENERGY AND TIME 
CONSUMPTION WITH [26] 
Device Energy (mJ) Time (ms) 
Coordinator 
(this study) 
4.9516 3.8371 
Sensor 
(this study) 
4.8378 3.7065 
Coordinator [26] 12.7713 208.782 
Chest-worn sensor 
[26] 
0.0720 0.6820 
Wrist-worn sensor 
[26] 
364.7503 486.4320 
 
D. Security analysis 
1. Vault security 
In this section, we discuss the security level of the vault. The 
security offered by the vault depends on the vault size (v) and 
the constructed polynomial order (N). More chaff points added 
to the vault and higher order of the constructed polynomial 
increase the vault security level. The latter can be calculated as 
follows:  
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𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝐶𝑣
𝑁)                                  (13) 
The test results obtained for different vault sizes and 
polynomial orders are shown in Fig.15.  
 
 
Fig. 15 Security level test results for different vault sizes (100 to 600) 
2. Anti-imitation attack ability 
In order to further evaluate the security performance of the 
proposed methods, we designed imitation attack experiments 
and analyzed the mimicking attack threats. 
In these experiments, 8 subjects were recruited and 
subdivided into 4 groups as shown in Table VI. Two subjects 
with a similar body shape (height and weight) or their walking 
style are naturally similar were selected in each group to act as a 
genuine user and his/her imitator (adversary). To achieve better 
mimicking effects, the adversaries were asked to imitate the 
walking style of the genuine users during the experiments. At 
the same time, two (wrist- and waist- worn) IMU sensors with a 
100Hz sampling frequency [41] were used to collect the 
walking acceleration data of the genuine user and the adversary 
simultaneously. The test scenario is illustrated by Fig. 16. 
 
TABLE VI: GROUPING AND PHYSICAL PARAMETERS OF THE TEST 
SUBJECTS 
Group Subject Gender 
Age 
(yrs) 
Height 
(cm) 
Weight 
(kg) 
G 1 
Sbj. 1 F 29 163 50 
Sbj. 2 F 37 164 55 
G 2 
Sbj. 3 M 30 157 62 
Sbj. 4 M 30 170 56 
G 3 
Sbj. 5 M 29 172 70 
Sbj. 6 M 36 174 80 
G 4 
Sbj. 7 F 32 165 56 
Sbj. 8 M 33 170 63 
 
Fig. 16 The imitation attack test scenario: genuine user and his/her gait 
imitator (adversary) 
For the threats’ model analysis, we considered the following 
two scenarios. The first one envisaged that the adversaries 
would try to generate the same key as genuine users of the same 
group by using their own acceleration signal through 
mimicking the walking style of the genuine user. For this 
scenario, the hamming distance (HD) between the keys 
generated by the genuine user and the adversary was used to 
evaluate the anti-imitation attack ability of the proposed 
methods.  
The acceleration signals collected by the IMU sensors worn 
on the wrist and waist were used to generate a 128-bits key, 
respectively, based on the proposed noise-based random key 
generation method. Then, the HD between the keys generated 
by genuine users and adversaries in the same group was 
computed, as shown in Fig. 17. The results indicate that the 
average HDs between keys generated from IMU sensors worn 
on the wrist and waist were 81 and 88 bits, respectively. Thus, 
the proposed noise-based random key generation method 
effectively prevented the adversaries to achieve the true key by 
mimicking the walking style of genuine users. 
 
Fig. 17 The HD between the keys generated by the genuine users and their 
adversaries 
The second scenario implied that the adversary would 
attempt to extract the key from the vault transmitted by the 
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genuine user through the public channel using his/her own gait 
feature through mimicking the walking style of the genuine 
user. 
In this test, a 128-bit binary key sequence and S (S=20) gait 
common information (gc1, gc2,…,gcS) were generated using the 
proposed methods based on the wait-worn acceleration sensor 
signal collected by the genuine user. Then, a 16-order 
polynomial function f(x) was constructed using segments of the 
generated 128-bit binary key sequence as its coefficients, and 
the genuine pairs of values (gci, f(gci)) which could be used to 
unlock the vault was computed by substituting the common gait 
information into the polynomial. A software random number 
generator was used to generate chaff points pairs that were not 
present in the polynomial function f(x), and genuine pairs and 
the generated chaff point pairs were merged and mixed to form 
a vault with a size of 300. The adversaries tried to unlock the 
vault using the common gait information extracted from their 
own acceleration sensors. In the absence of the application 
program for the sensor nodes, the performance was evaluated 
offline using the acceleration data collected in advance. It was 
assumed that the adversary nodes had no prior knowledge on 
the key length and the polynomial order, so the recovered key 
length could differ from that of the true/genuine key. We 
modified the similarity index (SI) defined in [26] to evaluate the 
similarity between the recovered and genuine keys via Eq. (13).  
𝑆𝐼 =
|𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐾𝑒𝑦∩𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐾𝑒𝑦|
|𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐾𝑒𝑦|
                (13) 
Here, SI varies between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate that 
the genuine and recovered key have more common elements. SI 
will be 1 if the recovered key is a subset of the genuine key and 
contains no chaff points. 
The SI values between (i) the genuine key generated by the 
waist-worn acceleration of the genuine user and those 
recovered via his/her wrist-worn acceleration sensor, (ii) the 
genuine key generated by the waist-worn acceleration of the 
genuine user and those recovered by the waist- and wrist-worn 
acceleration of the adversary, were computed and plotted in Fig. 
18. These test results strongly indicate that it is hard for any 
adversary to recover the genuine key by mimicking the walking 
style of the genuine user. 
 
Fig. 18 The values of SI  for the genuine  and recovered keys  
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposed a light-weight noise-based M-bit key 
generation method for wearable IoT devices. We designed a 
zero-phase filter to extract the noise imposed on the regular gait 
signal. As the noise has the properties of randomness and 
uncertainty, the binary sequence generated based on the noise 
value has good randomness and high entropy. For sharing the 
generated key among different wearable IoT devices in the 
same body area network, an SSWC-based common feature 
extraction method was first designed to extract the gait 
common information from acceleration signals sampled by 
different wearable IoT device. Next, fuzzy vault-based key 
distribution methods were used to secretly transmit the 
generated key among wearable IoT devices in the same body. A 
comprehensive analysis of the proposed key generation and 
distribution method proved that the binary keys generated via 
the introduced noise-based procedure have high entropy and 
can pass both the NIST and Dieharder statistical tests with high 
efficiency. The experimental results proved  the robustness of 
the proposed SSWC-based common feature extraction method 
in terms of the similarity and discriminability of intra- and 
inter-class features, respectively. 
For future research, the realistic scenarios’ online tests for 
gait-based key generation and distribution should be performed. 
The active attacks, including walking posture imitation and 
machine vision-based gait synthesis should be taken into 
consideration. The follow-up studies are envisaged to apply 
multi-biometric fusion-based secure methods to further 
enhance the security level of wearable devices. 
REFERENCES 
[1] M. Chen, S. Gonzalez, A. V. Vasilakos, H. Cao, V. C. Leung. Body area 
networks: A survey. Mobile Networks and Applications. 16(2), 
pp.171-93, 2011. 
[2] R. A. Khan and A. S. K. Pathan. The state-of-the-art wireless body area 
sensor networks: A survey. International Journal of Distributed Sensor 
Networks, 14(4), pp.1-23, 2018. 
[3] S. Hiremath, G. Yang, K. Mankodiya. Wearable Internet of Things: 
Concept, architectural components and promises for person-centered 
healthcare. International Conference on Wireless Mobile Communication 
and Healthcare-Transforming Healthcare Through Innovations in Mobile 
and Wireless Technologies (MOBIHEALTH), 2014. 
[4] Q. Jing, A. V. Vasilakos, J. Wan, J. Lu, D. Qiu. Security of the Internet of 
Things: perspectives and challenges. Wireless Networks. 20(8), 
pp.2481-501, 2014. 
[5] O. Arias, J. Wurm, K. Hoang, Y. Jin. Privacy and security in internet of 
things and wearable devices. IEEE Transactions on Multi-Scale 
Computing Systems, 1(2), pp.99-109, 2015. 
[6] M. Lee, K. Lee, J. Shim, S. J. Cho, J. Choi. Security threat on wearable 
services: Empirical study using a commercial smartband. IEEE 
International Conference on Consumer Electronics-Asia (ICCE-Asia), 
pp.1-5, 2016. 
[7] A. J. Perez and S. Zeadally. Privacy issues and solutions for consumer 
wearables. It Professional, 20(4), pp.46-56, 2017. 
[8] Y. Yang, X. Liu, R. H. Deng, Y. Li. Lightweight sharable and traceable 
secure mobile health system. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and 
Secure Computing, 17(1), pp.112-126, 2020. 
[9] U. Uludag, S. Pankanti, S. Prabhakar, A. K. Jain. Biometric 
cryptosystems: issues and challenges. Proceedings of the IEEE, 92(6), 
pp.948-960, 2004. 
[10] G. Zheng, R. Shankaran, W. Yang, C. Valli, L. Qiao, M. Orgun, and S. 
Mukhopadhyay. A critical analysis of ECG-based key distribution for 
securing wearable and implantable medical devices. IEEE Sensors 
Journal, 19(3), pp.1186-1198, 2018. 
[11] Z. Zhang, H. Wang, A. V. Vasilakos, H. Fang. ECG-cryptography and 
authentication in body area networks. IEEE Transactions on Information 
Technology in Biomedicine. 16(6), pp.1070-8, 2012. 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
15 
[12] K. K. Venkatasubramanian, A. Banerjee, S. K. S. Gupta. PSKA: Usable 
and secure key agreement scheme for body area networks. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine, 14(1), pp.60-68, 
2010. 
[13] S. Pirbhulal, H. Zhang, W. Wu, S. C. Mukhopadhyay, Y. Zhang. 
Heartbeats based biometric random binary sequences generation to secure 
wireless body sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Biomedical 
Engineering, 65(12), pp.2751-2759, 2018. 
[14] G. Zhang, C. Poon, Y. Zhang. Analysis of using interpulse intervals to 
generate 128-bit biometric random binary sequences for securing wireless 
body sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in 
Biomedicine, 16(1), pp.176-182, 2012. 
[15] F. Miao, S. Bao, Y. Li. Biometric key distribution solution with energy 
distribution information of physiological signals for body sensor network 
security. IET Information Security, 7(2), pp.87-96, 2013. 
[16] F. Sun, C. Mao, X. Fan, Y. Li. Accelerometer-based speed-adaptive gait 
authentication method for wearable IoT devices. IEEE IoT Journal, 6(1), 
pp. 820-830, 2018. 
[17] Y. Zhang, G. Pan, K. Jia, M. Lu, Y. Wang, Z. Wu. Accelerometer-based 
gait recognition by sparse representation of signature points with clusters. 
IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 45(9), pp.1864-1875, 2015.  
[18] M. Abuhamad, A. Abusnaina, D. Nyang, D. Mohaisen. Sensor-based 
Continuous Authentication of Smartphones' Users Using Behavioral 
Biometrics: A Survey. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.08578. 2020 Jan 23. 
[19] H. Zhao, Z. Wang, S. Qiu, J. Wang, F. Xu, Z. Wang Y. Shen. Adaptive 
gait detection based on foot-mounted inertial sensors and multi-sensor 
fusion. Information Fusion, 52, pp.157-166, 2019.  
[20] W. Xu, G. Lan, Q. Lin, S. Khalifa, M. Hassan, N. Bergmann, W. Hu. 
KEH-gait: Using kinetic energy harvesting for gait-based user 
authentication systems. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 18(1), 
pp.139-152, 2019.  
[21] F. Sun, W. Zang, R. Gravina, G. Fortino, Y. Li. Gait-based identification 
for elderly users in wearable healthcare systems. Information Fusion, 53, 
pp.134-144, 2020. 
[22] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, V. Bhat, A. V Vasilakos. LAM-CIoT: Lightweight 
authentication mechanism in cloud-based IoT environment. Journal of 
Network and Computer Applications, 150(2020), pp.102496, 2020. 
[23] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, N. Kumar, M. Conti, A. V. Vasilakos. A novel 
authentication and key agreement scheme for implantable medical 
devices deployment. IEEE journal of biomedical and health informatics. 
22(4), pp.1299-309, 2017. 
[24] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, A. V. Vasilakos. Authenticated key management 
protocol for cloud-assisted body area sensor networks. Journal of 
Network and Computer Applications. 123, pp.112-26, 2018. 
[25] D. Bichler, G. Stromberg, M. Huemer, M. Löw. Key generation based on 
acceleration data of shaking processes. In International Conference on 
Ubiquitous Computing, pp. 304-317. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. 
[26] G. Revadigar, C. Javali, W. Xu, A. V. Vasilakos, W. Hu, S. Jha. 
Accelerometer and fuzzy vault-based secure group key generation and 
sharing protocol for smart wearables. IEEE Transactions on Information 
Forensics and Security, 12(10), pp.2467-2482, 2017. 
[27] R. Mayrhofer and H. Gellersen. Shake well before use: Intuitive and 
secure pairing of mobile devices. IEEE Transactions on Mobile 
Computing, 8(6), pp.792-806, 2009. 
[28] Y. Sun and B. Lo. Random number generation using inertial measurement 
unit signals for on-body IoT devices. IET Conference on Living in the 
Internet of Things: Cybersecurity of the IoT, pp.28-9, 2018. 
[29] Y. Sun, W. Charence, G. Z. Yang, B. Lo. Secure key generation using gait 
features for body sensor networks. In 2017 IEEE 14th International 
Conference on Wearable and Implantable Body Sensor Networks (BSN), 
pp. 206-210, 2017. 
[30] W. Xu, G. Revadigar, C. Luo, N. Bergmann, W. Hu. Walkie-talkie: 
Motion-assisted automatic key generation for secure on-body device 
communication. In 2016 15th ACM/IEEE International Conference on 
Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN), pp. 1-12, 2016.  
[31] W. Xu, C. Javali, G. Revadigar, C. Luo, N. Bergmann and W. Hu. 
Gait-key: A gait-based shared secret key generation protocol for wearable 
devices. ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks. 13(1), pp.1-6, 2017. 
[32] A. Bruesch, L. Nguyen, D. Schürmann, S. Sigg, L. C. Wolf. Security 
properties of gait for mobile device pairing. IEEE Transactions on Mobile 
Computing, 19(3), pp.697-710, 2020. 
[33] Y Wu, Q Lin, H Jia, M Hassan, W Hu. Auto-Key: Using Autoencoder to 
Speed Up Gait-based Key Generation in Body Area Networks. 
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and 
Ubiquitous Technologies. 4(1), pp.1-23, 2020. 
[34] A. Ometov, P. Masek, L. Malina, R. Florea, J. Hosek, S. Andreev. 
Feasibility characterization of cryptographic primitives for constrained 
(wearable) IoT devices. IEEE International Conference on Pervasive 
Computing and Communication Workshops (PerCom Workshops), 
pp.1-6. 2016. 
[35] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg. A fuzzy commitment scheme. In 
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, pp. 28-36, 1999.  
[36] A. Juels and M. Sudan. A fuzzy vault scheme. Designs, Codes and 
Cryptography, 38(2), pp.237-257, 2006.. 
[37] C. Li, J. Hu, J. Pieprzyk. A new biocryptosystem-oriented security 
analysis framework and implementation of multibiometric cryptosystems 
based on decision level fusion. IEEE Transactions on Information 
Forensics and Security, 10(6), pp.1193-1206, 2015.  
[38] A. Rukhin. A statistical test suite for random and pseudorandom number 
generators for cryptographic applications (SP 800-22 Rev. 1a). Tech. Rep. 
Gaithersburg, MD, U.S.A.: National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2010. 
[39] R. G. Brown. Dieharder: A Random Number Test Suite. 2004. 
[40] M. A. Hoque, M. Siekkinen, K. N. Khan, Y. Xiao, S. Tarkoma. 
Modeling, profiling, and debugging the energy consumption of mobile 
devices. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 48(3), pp1-40, 2015. 
[41] Shimmer 3: http://www.shimmersensing.com/products/  
[42] T. Sztyler, H. Stuckenschmidt. On-body localization of wearable devices: 
An investigation of position-aware activity recognition. IEEE 
International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications 
(PerCom), pp.1-9, 2016. 
[43] https://sensor.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/ 
 
 
 
Fangmin Sun (M’20) received her B.S. 
degree in the Measurement and Control 
Technology and Instruments from Xian 
Electronic Technology University in 2010 
and her doctoral degree at the State Key 
Laboratory of Transducer Technology 
Institute of Electronics, Chinese Academy of 
Sciences in 2015. She is currently an 
associate professor at Shenzhen Institute of Advanced 
Technology (SIAT). Her research interests include multi 
sensor information fusion, activity recognition and gait 
analysis, wearable perception and computing. 
 
 
Weilin Zang received B.S. and M.S. degrees 
in communication engineering from Guilin 
University of Electronic Technology, Guilin, 
China, in 2006 and 2009 respectively and his 
doctor degree in Research Center for 
Biomedical information Technology in 
Shenzhen Institutes of advanced Technology 
(SIAT), Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2018. His main 
research interests include wireless body area networks and 
resource allocation in wireless communications. 
 
 
Haohua Huang received his B.S degree in the 
Measurement and Control Technology and 
Instruments from Guilin University of 
Electronic Technology, Guilin, China, in 2017. 
He is currently a M.S. candidate in Computer 
Technology from University of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences. His research interests 
include machine learning and wearable computing. 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
16 
 
Ildar Farkhatdinov is a lecturer (assistant 
professor) in robotics at the School of 
Electronic Engineering and Computer Science, 
Queen Mary University of London. Before 
joining QMUL, he was a research associate at 
Imperial College of London. He has received 
the B.Sc. in automation and control from the 
Moscow State University of Technology 
STANKIN, Moscow, Russia, the M.Sc. in mechanical 
engineering from the KoreaTech University South Korea, and 
the Ph.D. in robotics from the Sorbonne University, France. His 
research interests are assistive robotics and physical 
human-robot interaction. 
 
 
Ye Li (M’09-SM’19) is a professor in 
Shenzhen Institute of Advanced Technology 
(SIAT), Chinese Academy of Sciences. He 
received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in 
electrical engineering from University of 
Electronic Science and Technology of China, 
Chengdu, China, in 1999 and 2002, 
respectively. In 2006, he received the Ph. D. 
degree in electrical engineering from Arizona State University, 
AZ, US. In 2007, Dr. Li worked in Cadence Design Systems, 
Inc., San Jose, CA, the U.S. Since 2008 he is the Director of the 
Research Center for Biomedical Information Technology in 
SIAT. His research interests include body sensor networks, 
wearable computing, and health data mining. 
 
